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as	people	 focus	on	 individual	 survival	 strategies.	The	dominant	 strategy	
pursued	by	all	social	classes	involves	seeking	opportunities	to	save	money	
by	 limiting	 expenses	 and	modifying	 the	 hitherto	 applied	model	 of	 con-
sumption.	For	some	social	groups,	their	method	for	weathering	the	crisis	
also	 involves	 seeking	 additional	 employment	 opportunities	 in	 the	 grey	







































































































The crisis has had a limited impact on the job market. Unlike in the case of 
the 2008–2009 crisis, adaptation to the altered conditions is progressing 
































































The fall in real wages and the increase in prices during the crisis have 
contributed to an increase in the number of individuals affected by pov-







































The social consequences of the crisis vary considerably between individual 
regions, in part due to the diminishing transfers of funds from the federal 









































The ongoing economic crisis has contributed to a deterioration of the situ-
ation of all social classes and, in the case of many groups, to permanent 




















II. socIeTy and The crIsIs
Russians	are	aware	of	the	deteriorating	economic	situation.	According	to	re-




















foreign	currency	savings.	However, the basic strategy for weathering the 
crisis involves limiting one’s expenses by: buying cheaper products and 







































a	result	of	the	crisis.	However, the level of informal employment, which is 
a manifestation of the phenomenon referred to in Russia as the ‘garage 
















20	 For	 comparison,	 in	Poland	 these	 categories	 cover	 around	25%	of	household	 spending,	 in	
the	USA	around	10%.	Cf.	Н.	Райбман,	Впервые	за	восемь	лет	расходы	россиян	на	еду	

















of	the	availability	of	specific	career	paths.	This	causes	a boost in the so-called 
‘brain drain’	– a phenomenon which involves well-educated individuals 









Alongside	this,	in connection with the economic crisis and the drop in the 
value of the Russian currency, a sharp downward trend regarding eco-


































to	live,	but	we	can	bear	it”.	This suggests that Russian society is undergoing 
a change in how it functions during the crisis – from a consumer society 



















III. socIeTy and The governmenT:  







ment.	The increasingly negative assessments of the economic situation 
and the related drop in expectations regarding the financial situation 
have had only a marginal impact on the level of support for the govern-












It seems, however, that the number of protests has been on the rise dur-
ing the crisis. The main issues which encouraged people to attend protests 
included: cases of the violation of employees’ rights25, problems with access 
to services which emerged as a result of spending cuts introduced by the 
government (for example combining several hospitals into one, closing 
small schools, liquidating the post of school doctors), and the subsequent 
rises of various public levies (for example regulated rent). Only extremely 

































The anatomy of strike – the ‘platon’ system
The mechanisms used by the authorities involving the control of society 
and diverting people’s attention from the problems of daily life sometimes 
fail. In late autumn 2015 in several regions of Russia protests by truck 
drivers broke out against the introduction of the ‘Platon’ system and col-
lection of tolls for the use of national roads. According to the drivers, the 
fees for using federal roads were excessively high, which made their eco-
nomic activity unprofitable. The protesters’ anger was stoked by the fact 
that the revenue from the toll collection system was earned mainly by the 
system operator, a company owned by the Rotenberg brothers – friends of 
Vladimir Putin. In a short time, the protests covered the whole of Russia 
and became some of the biggest economically-motivated protests organised 
in recent years (they covered 24 of the total 83 regions27). The protest by 
truck drivers enjoyed support from society. According to estimates by the 
Levada Centre, in December 2015 63% of Russians and a staggering 72% of 




















The drivers used numerous forms of protest (road blockades, demonstra-
tions, driving at a slow pace through cities, petitions etc.), which made it 
difficult for the government to prevent them. The large scale of the protests 
was possible mainly due to the drivers’ networking activity. The earnings of 
truck drivers, who usually operate as one-man companies, have decreased 
significantly during the crisis. Faced with the potential loss of livelihood, 
the drivers proved to be a determined and independent group. The scale 
of the protests surprised the government, who initially offered restrained 
reactions, which additionally fostered the emergence of new centres of pro-
test. The drivers relatively quickly decided to present their demands di-
rectly to the president, which made it more difficult for the Kremlin to use 
the well-tested mechanism of shifting the responsibility onto the regions, 
but at the same time enabled Putin to play the role of the ‘good tsar’ who 
responds to society’s needs.
Despite the large scale of the protest against the introduction of the ‘Platon’ 
system, the Kremlin decided to reduce the tax imposed on the drivers only 
slightly and to maintain the system. The authorities granted the truck driv-
ers the right to deduct the tolls paid under the ‘Platon’ system from their 
transport tax and reduced the fines for failure to pay them. This solution has 
to a certain extent reduced the burden imposed on the drivers and contrib-
uted to silencing the protests. The costs of the deducted amount of tax are 
credited to the budgets of specific regions which used to earn revenue from 
the transport tax. The reaction of the government is also proof of the fact 
that although they fear protests and intend to cut spending, the interests of 




























An anti-system mood and actions are additionally weakened by the high 
level of state control of the economy, which successfully prevents any 





















this	type	of	involvement.	The present economic crisis has severely impacted 
the standards of living of the most politically active segments of the mid-
30	 In	2005,	the	estimated	share	of	the	state	in	the	economy	was	35%.	This	figure	was	70%	in	






32	 According	 to	 estimates	 by	 sociologist	 Natalia	 Tikhonova	 from	 the	 Russian	 Academy	
















dle class residing in big cities. Alongside the repressive measures which 
have intensified following the 2011–2012 protests, this has significantly 







tactic aimed at minimising the likelihood of protests in connection with 
the persistent crisis mainly involves: stepping up the repressive nature of 
the system, maintaining the high level of citizens’ dependence on the state, 
and protecting the authority of the president at the same time shifting the 
























































increased	popularity	of	opposition	parties.	Another tactic to maintain the 
president’s high approval rating involves shifting the responsibility in 
crisis situations onto the regional level of government or onto members 
of government and putting the blame for the widespread deterioration 






























































38	 By	 the	 beginning	 of	 December	 2016	 seven	 foreign	 non-governmental	 organisations	 had	



















This	tactic	has	proved	successful	and	the	increased repressive measures and 
bolstered state propaganda are contributing to a progressing atomisation 

































The	government	will	likely	seek	further	budget	savings.	Spending cuts in the 
sectors of education, health care and public transportation will contribute 
to a further deterioration of living standards in Russia, form barriers to 
future development, and fuel social discontent. It	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	
in	the	long-term	the	present	economic	crisis	will	cause	a	drop	in	the	number	of	
children	born	per	year	and	have	an	impact	on	the	general	health	of	the	popula-
tion	due	to	health	care	spending	cuts.	However, it is unlikely that the deterio-
ration of the financial situation and of the living standards of the Russian 
population will result in large-scale outbreaks of social discontent which 
































Although	 the	 strategy	 adopted	 by	 the	 government	 involving,	 for	 example,	
emphasising	the	temporary	nature	of	the	problems	and	pointing	to	external	
enemies	has	so	far	proved	successful	and	fostered	social	unification,	certain	
isolated	symptoms	of	its	waning	potential	may	be	observed.	In	particular	more	
affluent	groups	are	beginning	to	assess	the	direction	for	which	the	country	is	
heading	less	positively;	they	are	observing	the	deteriorating	living	standards	
with	growing	concern40.	Although	the	Russian	people	claim	to	be	ready	to	give	
up	Western	products	or	travelling	to	Western	countries	in	the	name	of	strength-
ening	their	country’s	position	in	the	international	arena,	they	do	not	consent	
to	tax	rises,	salary	freezes,	an	increase	in	the	retirement	age	and	employment	
cuts.	If	Russian	people	begin	to	feel	humiliated	(for	example	as	a	result	of	the	
deteriorating	quality	of	public	services),	outbursts	of	social	discontent	will	be	
likely.	Despite	its	political	apathy,	Russian	society	has	set	certain	limits	of	its	
consent	for	reducing	its	living	standards.	Going	beyond	these	limits	will	not	
instantaneously	 trigger	social	rebellion.	However,	should	there	be	a	power	
struggle	within	the	elite,	resulting	in	the	emergence	of	an	alternative	to	the	
present	ruling	group,	then	society	will	be	unlikely	to	offer	active	support	to	
the	present	regime41.
JAn StRzeleckI
40	 Н.Тихонова,	Стратификация…,	op. cit.
41	 One	quote	which	illustrates	the	lack	of	involvement	in	showing	support	for	the	government	
was	recalled	by	sociologist	Alexei	Levinson	from	the	Levada	Centre	regarding	Vladimir	Pu-
tin	and	was	originally	provided	by	a	participant	in	a	focus	group	research	session:	“I	think	
that	his	time	is	over,	that	is,	he	is	currently	at	the	top.	So	it	is	in	life	that	one	gets	to	the	top	
and	then	leaves	in	a	beautiful	fashion”.	
